

**ACTIONABLE THREAT INTELLIGENCE GENERATION BASED ON
DARKNET TRAFFIC ANALYSIS**

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STATEMENT BY THE AUTHOR

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in this thesis.

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ABSTRACT

ACTIONABLE THREAT INTELLIGENCE GENERATION BASED ON DARKNET TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

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
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The rise of Cyber security threat is evolving rapidly because the advancement of adversary and the adversary payload. In this era a solo fighter Cyber security defender is not an option and more and more Cyber Security Defender join hand to eliminate the emerging threat and eliminate the usage of the same payload to compromise system this joint work is realized by implementing Cyber Threat intelligent and in this thesis the main purpose is to automatically generate Actionable Cyber Threat Intelligence that is able to capture emerging threat by deploying passive monitoring, trap, deception tool into the darknet environment where supposed there shouldn't have a connection incoming and outgoing to the system, because of that the traffic that is coming to the darknet environment should be treated as an attack. This research categorize the result of the experiment based on the honeypot-based security threats, to generate into the Cyber Threat Information.

Keywords: Actionable Threat Intelligence, Darknet Monitoring, Threat categorization, Analysis of Threat, Traffic analysis, Malware analysis



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DEDICATION

I dedicate this to my Family.



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


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